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	<title>Comments on: TSC May 21 2008 &#124; The Right Way to Address the Debian OpenSSL Vulnerability</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.securitycatalyst.com/blog/2008/05/tsc-may-21-2008-the-right-way-to-address-the-debian-openssl-vulnerability/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.securitycatalyst.com/blog/2008/05/tsc-may-21-2008-the-right-way-to-address-the-debian-openssl-vulnerability/</link>
	<description>changing the way people protect information</description>
	<pubDate>Thu, 04 Dec 2008 03:47:58 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Michael.Starks</title>
		<link>http://www.securitycatalyst.com/blog/2008/05/tsc-may-21-2008-the-right-way-to-address-the-debian-openssl-vulnerability/#comment-2037</link>
		<dc:creator>Michael.Starks</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 25 May 2008 03:02:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securitycatalyst.com/blog/?p=449#comment-2037</guid>
		<description>I have also looked into this a bit more and I agree; it is a bit more serious than what I would call an "academic issue."  The brute-force space for these faulty keys is extremely small, and offline key exhaustion attacks on captured traffic is likely to be successful.  I wouldn't be surprised to see the script kiddies shifting their attack methods as a result of this flaw.

As an interesting aside, if Debian randomizes PIDs like I believe OpenBSD does, there would have been an additional (small and almost irrelevant) countermeasure against guessing the correct key.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have also looked into this a bit more and I agree; it is a bit more serious than what I would call an &#8220;academic issue.&#8221;  The brute-force space for these faulty keys is extremely small, and offline key exhaustion attacks on captured traffic is likely to be successful.  I wouldn&#8217;t be surprised to see the script kiddies shifting their attack methods as a result of this flaw.</p>
<p>As an interesting aside, if Debian randomizes PIDs like I believe OpenBSD does, there would have been an additional (small and almost irrelevant) countermeasure against guessing the correct key.</p>
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		<title>By: admin</title>
		<link>http://www.securitycatalyst.com/blog/2008/05/tsc-may-21-2008-the-right-way-to-address-the-debian-openssl-vulnerability/#comment-2036</link>
		<dc:creator>admin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 May 2008 22:16:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securitycatalyst.com/blog/?p=449#comment-2036</guid>
		<description>Michael,

To your first point: I initially thought the same thing, until I started asking around. I'm not convinced that people need to give up their holiday weekends to address this issue - but I do believe it needs to be addressed as something more than an academic exercise. However, the second part is disconcerting, since I fear it true: the time and money spent addressing this issue is likely to usurp time, money and attention from other areas.

As to Ubuntu - good to know!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Michael,</p>
<p>To your first point: I initially thought the same thing, until I started asking around. I&#8217;m not convinced that people need to give up their holiday weekends to address this issue - but I do believe it needs to be addressed as something more than an academic exercise. However, the second part is disconcerting, since I fear it true: the time and money spent addressing this issue is likely to usurp time, money and attention from other areas.</p>
<p>As to Ubuntu - good to know!</p>
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		<title>By: Michael.Starks</title>
		<link>http://www.securitycatalyst.com/blog/2008/05/tsc-may-21-2008-the-right-way-to-address-the-debian-openssl-vulnerability/#comment-2035</link>
		<dc:creator>Michael.Starks</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 May 2008 19:15:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securitycatalyst.com/blog/?p=449#comment-2035</guid>
		<description>Two thoughts:

Is this mostly an academic vulnerability in many organizations?  To put it another way, are many companies doing security so well that insecurely generated keys are going to get attention?  Or, will they pay attention to this at the expense of something like the Help Desk using default passwords to reset accounts?

Secondly, Ubuntu did an excellent job of handling this for me.  Not only did it give me the update, but it regenerated the affected system keys for me.

We need to continue taking this approach and apply it to things like drivers and perhaps even firmware.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Two thoughts:</p>
<p>Is this mostly an academic vulnerability in many organizations?  To put it another way, are many companies doing security so well that insecurely generated keys are going to get attention?  Or, will they pay attention to this at the expense of something like the Help Desk using default passwords to reset accounts?</p>
<p>Secondly, Ubuntu did an excellent job of handling this for me.  Not only did it give me the update, but it regenerated the affected system keys for me.</p>
<p>We need to continue taking this approach and apply it to things like drivers and perhaps even firmware.</p>
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