Firefox Patch Tuesday

by Carl Anctil

Background:
A few months ago, Microsoft released (and silently installed through Windows Update) a .NET Framework Assistant add-on for the Firefox web browser. Microsoft installed this add-on to Firefox without warning the user that the add-on would be installed as part of the .NET Framework 3.5 Service Pack 1. Security professionals, bloggers, users in general all over the Internet were in an uproar over Microsoft’s activities. Propel forward a few months, and Mozilla proactively disables two Microsoft-installed add-ons; one of them is the infamous .NET FA add-on. Following some discussions with Microsoft, Mozilla later selected to unblock the .NET FA, but continued to block the .NET Windows Presentation Foundation add-on.

Situation:
The browser is rapidly becoming the “new” OS, and add-ons are the “new” applications. This is the new computer model. The momentum is moving toward SaaS, IaaS, PaaS and other cloud computing acronyms. The impact this is having is such that our browsers are acting more and more like Operating Systems.

If we look back and remember how networking has evolved over the years, we will notice a pattern.  Many years ago, networking emerged from thin clients, then it advanced to thick clients and now we are going back to thin clients. The browser is the new thin client. It’s essentially the new OS. It isn’t a coincidence that Google’s new OS is called Chrome OS. Or is it? Can anyone say: “Firefox patch Tuesday”? I think we may have witnessed the first Firefox patch push.

When Mozilla decided to proactively block two Microsoft add-ons, the result of this action was effectively the same as patching a vulnerability (automatic updates). The reason these two distinct actions are similar is because the results are the same; they both prevent, fix, or block a vulnerability from an exploit. The block imposed by Mozilla impacted every instance of Firefox automatically, without user interaction.

What’s even more disturbing with this model is its ability to completely bypass many perimeter defences. This cloaking behaviour is a huge blow for the security of our networks. It’s giving a transporter to our adversaries to infiltrate our networks. Once inside our browsers, this enemy fundamentally becomes a virtual insider on our networks. It turns our users into allies and uses tactics that are very effective and easy to deploy: Tricks like social engineering, spear phishing, SPAM and emails with various types of specially-crafted attachments, etc.

We must protect and educate our greatest asset, which is coincidentally also our weakest link: The user. Vulnerabilities such as XSS, XSF, drive-by downloads, etc. are almost always triggered by trusted, authenticated and authorized users on the network.

Conclusion:
I just touched on this subject, but I believe a general awareness strategy will have to play an important role in the future. The bad guys will keep winning as long as they are the only ones reaching out to our users. We must positively reach out to users or they will keep getting tricked into doing things against us (and themselves).